The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

June 2015

Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules: Why the
Shady Grove Plurality was Right
Mark P. Gaber

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Gaber, Mark P. (2011) "Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules: Why the Shady Grove Plurality was Right," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 44 : Iss. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Gaber: Maintaining Uniform Federal Rules

8-GABER_44.4_8.7.11_ DONE-9.2.11.DOC

9/12/2011 8:39 AM

SYMPOSIUM: ERIE UNDER ADVISEMENT:
THE DOCTRINE AFTER SHADY GROVE
MAINTAINING UNIFORM FEDERAL RULES:
WHY THE SHADY GROVE PLURALITY WAS RIGHT
Mark P. Gaber*

I. Introduction ....................................................................... 979
II. Shady Grove v. Allstate: Scalia Plurality and Ginsburg
Dissent ............................................................................... 980
A. Facts and Posture ........................................................ 980
B. An Erie Background ................................................... 982
C. Rule 23 v. Section 901(b): Unavoidable Conflict...... 984
III. Justice Stevens’s “Sufficiently Interwoven” Test ............. 991
IV. Conclusion: Future Litigation and Shady Grove’s Irony.. 995
I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1 holding that
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a class action to
proceed even where the state that created the cause of action explicitly
prohibits that claim from being brought as a class action. Shady Grove
is the latest in the long line of cases applying the Erie doctrine. Shady
Grove’s splintered opinion, with its unlikely line-up of justices (Scalia,
Sotomayor, Roberts, and Thomas plurality; Stevens concurrence;
Ginsburg, Alito, Breyer, Kennedy dissent), demonstrates the complexity
of the substance/procedure distinction of the Erie cases.
* J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010; B.A., St. Norbert College, 2005. I am grateful to Professor
Janet Alexander of Stanford Law School for her helpful guidance and comments in developing this
piece. Furthermore, I wish to thank Robert Garcia, Clifford Davidson, and N. Andrew Sfeir for
their suggestions.
1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
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This Article examines the Court’s decision in Shady Grove,
concluding that Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion has the better
argument—his approach is the most consonant with precedent and the
least disruptive to the careful balance the Court has struck with its Erie
line of cases. Part II examines Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, and
considers its strengths and weaknesses. I then turn to Justice Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion, concluding that it rests on a fundamental
misapplication of the Erie doctrine, though she admirably attempts to
give teeth to the substantive rights limitation of the Rules Enabling
Act—a limitation that the Erie doctrine admittedly ignores. Part III
considers the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, who suggests a
middle ground test that, while initially appealing, collapses under the
weight of a closer analysis. It is not yet clear which opinion will provide
controlling precedent in future cases, and this paper argues that the
plurality opinion should control as the narrowest ground of decision,
rather than Justice Stevens’s concurrence.
I conclude with a discussion of the case’s ironic result and the
lesson Shady Grove provides for future Congresses that might attempt to
achieve substantive outcomes by regulating procedure. Shady Grove
reached federal court through diversity jurisdiction made possible only
by a Republican Congress’s enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA), which, ironically, was passed with the purpose of reducing the
number of class actions. Since its enactment, CAFA has become a tool
for the plaintiff’s bar—leading to even more class action suits.
Congressional regulations of procedure are uniquely capable of
backfiring by producing results inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
II. SHADY GROVE V. ALLSTATE: SCALIA PLURALITY AND GINSBURG
DISSENT
A.

Facts and Posture

Shady Grove came before the Court under a set of facts reminiscent
of a civil procedure law school exam. Sonia E. Galvez of Maryland was
injured in a car accident while driving her New York registered car on
May 30, 2005.2 She was insured by Allstate, a citizen of Illinois.3 After
the accident, Ms. Galvez received medical treatment for her injuries at

2. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008).
3. Id. at 1.
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates in Maryland.4 The substantive law
5
governing the case is that of New York, where her car was registered.
New York’s insurance law requires that insurance companies pay
benefits to customers within thirty days of receiving a properly
documented claim; failure to make timely distribution of benefits results
in a two percent interest charge per month.6 A separate New York
statutory provision, in the state’s procedural code, prohibits class action
7
suits for statutory minimum damages or penalties. In partial payment
of her medical bills, Ms. Galvez assigned her right to insurance benefits
to Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates—a claim that Allstate paid,
though not by the thirty-day deadline mandated by law.8 Allstate then
refused to pay the statutory interest of two-percent per month required
by statute.9 Alleging that Allstate regularly refused to pay the statutory
penalty amount, Shady Grove filed a class action suit in the Eastern
District of New York, asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d)(2),10 amended in 2005 under CAFA to expand federal diversity
11
The Petitioners proposed a class of
jurisdiction over class actions.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 5-6.
6. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2010).
7. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901 (McKinney 2010) provides in relevant part:
§
901.
Prerequisites
to
a
class
action
(b) Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a
penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be
maintained as a class action.
Id.
8. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010).
9. Id.
10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 6. Section 1332(d)(2) provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is a class action in which—
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any
defendant;
(B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a
foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a
foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (emphasis added).
11. Before passage of the CAFA in 2005, section 1332 required complete diversity of parties,
even in class actions, and thus, Petitioners would not have been able to assert diversity jurisdiction
in this matter. Congress passed CAFA in response to business concerns that state courts were too
friendly to class action lawsuits. The findings and purposes of CAFA indicate that, from the mid1990s through 2005, there had been “abuses of the class action device” that “harmed plaintiffs with
legitimate claims and defendants who [had] acted responsibly,” and “undermined public respect for
our judicial system.” Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2005) (setting forth
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over 1,000 members—well in excess of the 100 required by CAFA—
12
with statutory penalty damages exceeding five million dollars.
Allstate responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Erie
doctrine required that New York’s prohibition on class actions be
applied, not Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and as such
the class action could not be maintained.13 The district court granted the
motion to dismiss, and the Second Circuit affirmed.14 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and the Court heard oral arguments on
15
November 2, 2009, releasing its opinion on March 31, 2010.
B.

An Erie Background

Before turning to an analysis of Shady Grove, a brief background
discussion on Erie is necessary to provide the context of the case. In
Erie, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not permit federal courts
hearing diversity cases to supplant state law with “federal general
common law.”16 This accords with the two statutes on point—the Rules
of Decision Act17 (RODA) and the Rules Enabling Act18 (REA): the
findings and purposes). Specifically, Congress took state courts to task for “keeping cases of
national importance out of Federal Court; sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against
out-of-State defendants; and making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of residents of those States.” Id.; see also Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism
from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political
Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (2008).
12. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 7.
13. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 11-12, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467 (2006) (No. 06 CV 1842 (NG) (KAM)), 2006 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions
LEXIS 38759. In its Motion to Dismiss, Allstate argued that under the Erie line of cases and
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988), Federal Rule 23 did not displace the New
York prohibition on class actions. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, supra, at 11-12. It relied
heavily on Leider v. Ralfe, 387 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), a class action for treble damages
under the state’s anti-trust law. The treble damages constituted a penalty under New York law, and
under section 901(b), could not be maintained as a class action. The Leider court found that the
state statute and Rule 23 addressed different issues, and thus, could co-exist. Respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss, supra, at 11-12; Leider, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 290. The Leider court found section 901(b)
substantive for Erie purposes because application of Rule 23 would lead to forum-shopping—one of
the twin aims Erie was meant to avoid. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
14. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137, 146 (2008). The
Second Circuit likewise found that there was no collision between Rule 23 and section 901(b). The
court noted that both Rule 23 and New York’s analogue class action procedural statute, section
901(a), established the requirements for maintaining a class action. However, the court found that
“there is no analogue to [section 901(b)] in Rule 23.” Id. at 143. Thus, the court held that section
901(b) is substantive for Erie purposes and operates co-extensively with Rule 23. Id. at 144.
15. Shady Grove Orthopedics Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
16. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). RODA provides that: “The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
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substantive law is supplied by the state, while the federal procedural
rules apply. In promulgating federal rules of procedure under REA, the
Supreme Court may not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.”19 Of course, the line between procedure and substance is not
always clear. “[C]lassification of a law as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’
for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor.”20 Since Erie in
1938, the Court has struggled to explain the doctrine. For a while, it
looked to whether a state statute was “outcome determinative,” and if so,
it labeled it “substantive” and applied state law. 21 The Court moved
away from this approach in Hanna v. Plumer.22 In Hanna, the Court
found that, on the basis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, combined
with Congress’s constitutional power to establish lower federal courts,
Congress could “regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable
of classification as either.”23 In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,24 the Court
announced the test for determining if a federal rule “abridge[s],
enlarge[s], or modif[ies] any substantive right.”25 “The test must be
whether a rule really regulates procedure—the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”26
Together, Hanna and Sibbach hold that if there is a direct conflict
between a federal rule and a state statute, the federal rule will supplant
the state statute so long as the federal rule can rationally be classified as
procedural and it, in fact, “really regulates procedure.” This is so
because if the federal rule is rationally capable of classification as
procedural, then the Supremacy Clause requires the conflicting state law
to give way. If, on the other hand, there is not a direct conflict between
the federal rule and the state statute, then Hanna requires that the
“relatively unguided Erie”27 choice be made as to whether state or
federal law applies, with RODA as the guide. In making that choice, the

provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.” Id.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
19. Id.
20. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
21. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
22. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
23. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25. Id. at 14; 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
26. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
27. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
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Court cautioned that the “[o]utcome-determination analysis was never
intended to serve as a talisman,”28 and that the outcome-determination
test “cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws.”29 In that case, a court would consider
whether application of the federal rule would lead to forum-shopping or
inequitable administration of the laws, and if so, Erie would dictate that
the federal rule give way to the state statute.
But a court applying the REA analysis, where there is a direct
conflict, would only assess the state statute for the purpose of
determining if there is a conflict with a federal rule—to determine if the
federal rule affects substantive rights in violation of the REA, the court
would look only to the federal rule to see if it regulates procedure.30
Unfortunately, the Court did not leave well enough alone. In Gasperini
v. Center for Humanities,31 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
stated that federal rules should be interpreted “with sensitivity to
important state interests.”32 This command seemingly comports with the
REA’s requirement that the federal rules of procedure not affect
substantive rights. But it marks a departure from Hanna and Sibbach—
one that Justice Scalia refuses to take in Shady Grove.33 I turn now to
the Court’s decision in Shady Grove.
C.

Rule 23 v. Section 901(b): Unavoidable Conflict

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas, Roberts, Sotomayor, and
Stevens, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Second Circuit and
finding that Rule 23 and section 901(b) of the New York procedural
code were in conflict—“[b]oth of § 901’s subsections undeniably answer
the same question as Rule 23: whether a class action may proceed for a
given suit.”34 But that was the only issue on which Justice Scalia was
able to muster five votes. Justice Stevens penned a separate concurring
opinion, suggesting that in some cases, an ordinarily procedural state law
28. Id. at 466-67.
29. Id. at 468.
30. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010).
31. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
32. Id. at 427 n.7.
33. Justice Scalia acknowledges the obvious criticism of his position in favor of the Sibbach
test, which is that it is difficult to determine if a federal rule “really regulates procedure” if one is
not allowed to examine the state law to determine its substantive effect. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at
1445-46. While this critique is valid, the opposite result, with the potential for variation in the
meaning of the federal rules from state to state, “would be chaos.” Id.
34. Id. at 1439.
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might be so “sufficiently interwoven” with the state’s substantive law as
to require it to supplant a federal rule.35 Justice Scalia devoted a large
section of his opinion to refuting Justice Stevens, a section that Justice
Sotomayor did not join.36
Justice Scalia’s critical disagreement with the dissent, written by
Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito, is
based on whether Rule 23 is in conflict with New York’s law banning
class actions for statutory penalties. On this point, Justice Scalia has the
better of the arguments. Rule 23 provides that a class action may be
“maintained” if “two conditions are met: The suit must satisfy the
criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation), and it also must fit into one
of the three categories of subdivision (b).”37 The New York statute,
which is included in the state’s procedural code, discusses when class
actions “may not be maintained.”38 At base, the federal statute, Rule 23,
discusses when class actions may be maintained, and the New York
statute, section 901(b), discusses when they may not be maintained.
Rule 23 is completely silent about statutory penalty cases. Very clearly,
a statutory penalty class action, like the litigation in Shady Grove, is
disallowed under the New York rule, and allowed under Rule 23—the
conflict between the federal and state law could not be more direct.
Justice Scalia rejects the Second Circuit’s argument that the New
York law actually addresses a different question—whether a certain type
or class of claims is eligible for class treatment.39 Under the Second
Circuit’s reading, the dispute in Shady Grove would never reach the
doorstep of Rule 23 because New York law would make it ineligible for
maintenance as a class action. But as Justice Scalia states, “the line
between eligibility and certifiability is entirely artificial; both are
preconditions for maintaining a class action.”40 The fact that the words
are interchangeable is “a sure sign that . . . the distinction is made-toorder.”41 Further support, as Justice Scalia notes, is found in specific
federal claims that Congress has put outside Rule 23’s reach.42 Congress

35. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1442, 1444 (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 1437; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
38. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2010).
39. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Justice Scalia cites 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2006) (addressing judicial review of
alien removal orders). Allstate argued in briefing that this fact demonstrated that Rule 23 was not
all-inclusive, and thus, left room for the operation of section 901(b). Brief for Respondent at 14,
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believed that, unless it specifically excepted certain claims, cases
meeting the requirements of Rule 23 would be permitted to proceed as
class actions. Therefore, had Congress meant to except from Rule 23’s
coverage suits seeking statutory penalties, it would have done so
explicitly.
The dissenters, led by Justice Ginsburg, disagree that there is a
direct conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b). Justice Ginsburg’s
analysis rests on ambiguous state legislative history and the conclusion
that New York’s statute, which, by its terms, regulates when class
actions may not be maintained, actually is a substantive cap on damages.
Justice Ginsburg points to the signing statement of then-Governor, Hugh
Carey of New York, who said that section 901(b) “‘empowers the court
to prevent abuse of the class action device and provides a controlled
remedy.’”43 She concludes, “The limitation was not designed with the
fair conduct or efficiency of litigation in mind. Indeed, suits seeking
statutory damages are arguably best suited to the class device because
individual proof of factual damages is unnecessary.”44 Justice Ginsburg
goes on to conclude that
New York’s decision instead to block class-action proceedings for
statutory damages therefore makes scant sense, except as a means to a
manifestly substantive end: Limiting a defendant’s liability in a single
lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties—
remedies the New York Legislature created with individual suits in
mind.45

If section 901(b)’s drafters intended it to serve a “manifestly
substantive end” as Justice Ginsburg concludes, why did the legislature
choose to put it in the state’s procedural code? And why did they use
language that mimics the procedural language of Rule 23—whether
suits may or may not be “maintained” as class actions? Indeed, as Shady
Grove argued at oral arguments,46 section 901(b) is not limited to actions
based upon New York substantive law. As petitioners argue in their
brief, “[b]ecause New York has no power to determine the substantive

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008), 2009
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 836 at *14. The Court rejected this argument and instead found this fact
detrimental to Allstate’s position. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
43. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Memorandum on
Approving L. 1975, Ch.207, reprinted in 1975 N.Y. Laws, at 1748).
44. Id. at 1465.
45. Id.
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (No. 08-1008).
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rights of litigants under federal statutes, or statutes of other states, the
facial applicability to section 901(b) to actions brought under such
statutes is incompatible with the notion that it defines substantive
rights.”47
True, as petitioners admitted at oral arguments,48 there are no
examples of New York courts applying section 901(b) to actions based
on other states’ substantive laws, though there have been cases applying
it to federal substantive laws.49 This is hardly a convincing attack on the
procedural nature of the law—after the New York courts initially
decided the statute applied as a procedural rule to bar statutory penalty
class actions in the federal cases, why would anyone else file such a
claim in New York?
Justice Ginsburg acknowledges that “[i]t is true that section 901(b)
is not specifically limited to claims arising under New York law. But
neither is it expressly extended to claims arising under foreign law.”50
Justice Ginsburg goes on to state that “New York legislators make law
with New York plaintiffs and defendants in mind, i.e., as if New York
were the universe,” suggesting that the legislature simply did not
contemplate that New York courts might hear cases based on other
states’ laws.51
The implication, that New York would have to explicitly extend
application of a rule to foreign claims in order for it to definitively
classify that rule as procedural, is too stretched. The state’s joinder
rules, for example, say nothing about their explicit application to foreign
claims.52 Under Justice Ginsburg’s theory, the absence of such an
explicit statement might make the joinder rules substantive.
Furthermore, the New York legislature included a provision in its
procedural code granting full faith and credit to the judgments of foreign
jurisdictions,53 belying Justice Ginsburg’s claim that the New York
legislature operates under the impression that the legal universe consists
solely of New York plaintiffs and defendants. Finally, the state

47. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 2, at 36.
48. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 46, at 14.
49. See Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Cape Canaveral Tour & Travel, Inc., 799 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005) (rejecting the argument that section 901(b) was substantive and applying it to claim
under federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Vickers v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 390
N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (permitting class action under federal Truth in Lending Act
because it expressly authorized class actions, as required by section 901(b)).
50. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 601 (McKinney 2010).
53. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5402(b) (McKinney 2010).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 3

8-GABER_44.4_8.7.11_ DONE-9.2.11.DOC

988

9/12/2011 8:39 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:979

legislature was explicit in the introduction to its procedural rules that
“the civil practice law and rules shall govern the procedure in civil
judicial proceedings in all courts of the state . . . .”54 The clarity of the
statutory text undermines Justice Ginsburg’s turn to the legislative
history, which itself is not exceptionally convincing.
More alarming are the potential ramifications of Justice Ginsburg’s
argument on future applications of Rule 23 in federal court. Justice
Ginsburg opens her dissent with the argument that section 901(b) is
actually about damages: “The Court today approves Shady Grove’s
attempt to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award . . . .”55
Justice Ginsburg conflates each class member’s claim with the class
action case. This is what every class action does—it is a procedural tool
to permit claimants to aggregate many claims into one case. It is
impossible to ignore the implication of Justice Ginsburg’s argument on
the operation of Rule 23—if accepted, her argument inescapably brings
into question whether Rule 23 is truly procedural, or if it, in fact, is
actually substantive, creating just the type of slippery slope Justice
Ginsburg derides.56
If it is true that section 901(b)—again, by its terms about
“maintenance” of a class action—is actually a substantive cap on
damages, then how does Rule 23 retain its procedural label? It, too, is
about when class actions may be maintained. If the New York statute’s
prohibition of class actions is really a cap on damages over a certain
amount, then how is Rule 23 not actually a substantive grant of damages
over a certain amount? Accepting her argument, Rule 23 is actually a
substantive expansion of litigating power for each claimant—leading to
a large case award. Justice Ginsburg, perhaps anticipating this argument
(one that was not made by Justices Scalia or Stevens), preemptively
argues that Rule 23 is, in fact, procedural.
Rule 23 prescribes the considerations relevant to class certification and
postcertification proceedings—but it does not command that a
particular remedy be available when a party sues in a representative
capacity. Section 901(b), in contrast, trains on the latter issue.

54. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added).
55. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1465 n.5. Justice Ginsburg responds to the Petitioner’s argument that, if Allstate
were to prevail, courts would always look to state law rather than Rule 23 when certifying classes,
by stating that “[t]his slippery slope projection is both familiar and false,” and noting that “ Judges
and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski to the bottom. ” Id.
(citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 169 (1990)). Perhaps that statement is so,
but it assumes a slope with no slip.
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Sensibly read, Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class litigation,
but allows state law to control the size of a monetary award a class
plaintiff may pursue.57

Justice Ginsburg draws a distinction that does not exist—or exists
only on the basis of scant (and refutable) state legislative history. Also,
her last point is incorrect. Section 901(b) says nothing about what a
class plaintiff may pursue—it just says they cannot aggregate their
claims. On a purely textual basis, Rule 23 allows class actions where
section 901(b) does not—they are precisely opposites. At least for those
particular cases, accepting Justice Ginsburg’s argument, one can easily
argue that Rule 23 does not govern procedural aspects of class
litigation—instead it actually operates as a substantive floor on damages,
by allowing individual damages to be aggregated into a large case
award—that, in theory, is just the sum of all individual claims, in
practice, is larger because most individuals would not sue on their own.58
Indeed, CAFA, the statute that expanded federal jurisdiction for class
actions, specifically mandates that class actions governed under Rule 23
in diversity cases involve damages in excess of five million dollars.59
Under Justice Ginsburg’s analysis, Rule 23, particularly when operating
in coordination with CAFA, is actually a substantive regulation about
damages.
It is not difficult to imagine that, if Justice Ginsburg had prevailed,
a federal judge not fond of class actions60 might adopt this argument to
declare, on an as-applied basis, that a certain run-of-the-mill class action
suit under Rule 23 was impermissibly substantive—precisely for the
reason that all class actions meet the superiority requirement of Rule
23(b)(3). They involve small individual claims, and without the class
action mechanism, there would be little economic incentive for an
individual to bring suit.61 So conceived, Rule 23 would run afoul of
57. Id. at 1465-66.
58. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974). Landers
argues that in a practical sense, Rule 23 created an action that otherwise did not exist because no
one would bring many of the small individual claims that are aggregated into class actions—and
that this treats businesses, who also often have no recourse for small individual claims against
clients, unfairly. Id. at 845-47.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
60. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). In RhonePoulenc, Judge Posner reversed a grant of class certification for HIV-positive hemophiliacs on the
concern that an unreviewable class certification grant could lead to “‘blackmail settlements.’” Id. at
1298 (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973)).
61. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note. The Advisory Committee’s Note
states that “[t]he interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong as to call
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section 34 of the Rules Enabling Act, which requires that the federal
rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,”62 because
the defendant would otherwise face no lawsuit.
Of course, this argument is not what Justice Ginsburg intended—
she rejected it herself by declaring Rule 23 procedural;63 however, that is
not the point. Following Justice Ginsburg’s argument, to its natural
conclusion, inevitably leads one to question the procedural status of Rule
23—and that alone should suffice to demonstrate the dissent’s illconception, given Rule 23’s consistent and widespread acceptance.64
for denial of a class action.” Id. A class action suit will meet the superiority requirement where this
is not the case—that is, “where each injured person’s limited damages would make individual
litigation cost-prohibitive.” ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND
OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 245 (2000).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
63. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1466 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64. The acceptance of Rule 23’s constitutionality, though unanimous among the Court—as
demonstrated in Shady Grove—has not been entirely unanimous among commentators. Martin
Redish argues that Rule 23—and by extension the REA and the entirety of the Federal Rules of
Procedure and Evidence—are unconstitutional because they are promulgated by the Supreme Court,
and Congress only acts if it objects to them. MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 228-32 (2009).
Redish argues that class actions “undermine democracy . . . by the indirect manipulation of
underlying substantive law, under the guise of a procedural mechanism. In this manner, the class
action contravenes basic dictates of legislative transparency and electoral accountability that are
essential to the operation of a successful democratic system.” Id. at 228.
Redish extends his criticism to the process established by the REA: “the current class
action rule is legislatively promulgated by the one branch of the federal government that is
unrepresentative of and unaccountable to the electorate.” Id. at 229. He then concludes by
suggesting “[f]or the modern class action rule to possess both constitutional and democratic
legitimacy, it must be promulgated, in the first instance, through legislative enactment in accord
with the constitutional dictates of bicameralism and presentment.” Id. To be sure, Redish
acknowledges that as a practical matter, there is no reason to believe that the constitutionality of the
REA, at least as declared by the Court, is in doubt. Id. at 64. He nonetheless doubts its
constitutionality. See also Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV.
617, 641 (2010) (stating that cy pres awards to charities of unclaimed settlement funds violate the
constitution by creating a trilateral, rather than bilateral, adjudicative system, turning a
compensatory scheme into a civil fine, and violating the due process rights of defendants and absent
class members); Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2007) (arguing that the
mandatory participation components of Rule 23 and the opt-out provisions are unconstitutional
impositions on individual litigants’ autonomy under procedural due process).
While Redish raises interesting points, his main constitutional objection—that the REA’s
process of Court-promulgated federal rules undermines democratic legitimacy—is unconvincing.
First, Congress can always reject the rules. Second, his argument relies on the suggestion that it is
“political nonsense” that the rules regulate procedure internal to the operation of the courts—that
the rules “impact the scope of substantive political choices.” REDISH, supra, at 64. However, as
Justice Scalia states in Shady Grove, this “has no bearing on [the parties’] legal rights . . . [and is]
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The better view—and that of five justices—is that there is a direct
conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b). Indeed, Justice Stevens, in
his concurrence, says the dissenters should “argue within the Enabling
Act’s framework” rather than deny a conflict.65
III. JUSTICE STEVENS’S “SUFFICIENTLY INTERWOVEN” TEST
Justice Stevens begins his opinion by stating his agreement with
Justice Scalia that Rule 23 applies in the case, but also that he agrees
with Justice Ginsburg that “there are some state procedural rules that
federal courts must apply in diversity cases because they function as part
of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.”66 Justice
Stevens announces the test that he would apply: “[I]f a federal rule
displaces a state rule that is procedural in the ordinary sense of the term,
but sufficiently interwoven with the scope of a substantive right or
remedy,”67 then the federal rule must give way to the state rule, lest the
“substantive rights” sentence of the REA be violated.
While Justice Stevens agrees with Justice Scalia that the relevant
framework is provided by the REA, and not the RODA, Justice Stevens
believes that the state law must be examined and that “federal courts
must respect [the] choice” of states “to use a traditionally procedural
vehicle as a means of defining the scope of substantive rights or
remedies.”68 Justice Stevens, like Justice Ginsburg, leans on the
statement from Gasperini that federal rules should be interpreted with

just the sort of ‘incidental effec[t]’ [the Court has] long held does not violate [the REA].” 130 S. Ct.
at 1443. Affecting substantive political choices is simply not the same thing as “abridging,
expanding, or modifying substantive rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
Simply put, no plaintiff’s or defendant’s substantive rights are changed by the existence of the class
action mechanism. That a plaintiff might choose to exercise a preexisting right, as a result of Rule
23, is of no relevance to the constitutional analysis.
Finally, Redish’s concerns about democratic accountability are overstated. Congress can
always—and in the case of the 1973 Federal Rules of Evidence, did—reject a rule. See Act of Mar.
30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. Further, Congress has enacted a number of laws passing on
or discussing Rule 23—indicating, through Article I bicameralism and presentment, its endorsement
of the Rule. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2006) (prohibiting use of class actions for
immigration removal judicial review); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2006) (establishing procedures for private
securities litigation class actions); 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2006) (asserting Rule 23 representative
plaintiff requirements for consumer product warranty class actions); 15 U.S.C. § 6614 (2006)
(establishing requirements for class actions based on Y2K bug product defects); 28 U.S.C. §
1332(d) (2006) (extending federal diversity jurisdiction to cover class actions based on minimal
diversity for disputes in excess of five million dollars).
65. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 1448.
67. Id. at 1456.
68. Id. at 1450.
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“‘sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.’”69
Notably, Justice Stevens states his disagreement with Justice Ginsburg’s
application of RODA: “I disagree with Justice Ginsburg . . . about the
degree to which the meaning of federal rules may be contorted, absent
congressional authorization to do so, to accommodate state policy
goals.”70
Justice Stevens takes Justice Scalia to task for ignoring the REA’s
substantive rights limitation—suggesting that his test is no more difficult
for courts to apply than that of the plurality, and that even if it were,
Justice Scalia’s preference for bright-line rules “does not give us license
to adopt a second-best interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act. Courts
cannot ignore text and context in the service of simplicity.”71 Summing
up his view of Justice Scalia’s approach, Justice Stevens says: “The
plurality’s ‘test’ is no test at all—in a sense, it is little more than the
statement that a matter is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural.”72
Applying his test, Justice Stevens finds first that Rule 23 controls
the question of whether a class may be certified73 and that section 901(b)
is not sufficiently interwoven with the state’s substantive law so as to
pre-empt application of Rule 23.74 He cites the fact that section 901(b)
applies to claims based on federal and other states’ laws,75 that it is
found in the procedural section of the state’s code,76 and that the
legislative history cited by Justice Ginsburg only demonstrated that there
was “some policy reason”77 for the law—but that the legislature
demonstrated a “classically procedural calibration of making it easier to
litigate claims in New York courts (under any source of law) only when
it is necessary to do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is
not required.”78 Finally, he notes that Justice Ginsburg’s assertion that
this turns a $500 case into a $5,000,000 case79 is incorrect—that it, in
fact, turns 10,000 $500 cases into one $5,0000,000 case.80 In the end,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1449 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1451 n.5.
Id. at 1454.
Id. at 1454 n.10.
Id. at 1456.
Id. at 1459-60.
Id. at 1457.
Id. at 1460.
Id. at 1458 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1459.
Id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1459 n.18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens finds the text of section 901(b) too straightforwardly
procedural to make application of Rule 23 a violation of the REA.81
In doing so, Justice Stevens clarifies his newly announced test to
reflect the rarity with which a federal Rule will be found to violate the
substantive rights limitation of the REA:
The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests
it reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a
judgment about the scope of state-created rights and remedies. And
for the purposes of operating a federal court system, there are costs
involved in attempting to discover the true nature of a state procedural
rule and allowing such a rule to operate alongside a federal rule that
appears to govern the same question. The mere possibility that a
federal rule would alter a state-created right is not sufficient. There
must be little doubt.82

To be sure, Justice Stevens’s approach gives the superficial
satisfaction of giving credence to the REA’s limitation on the federal
Rules’ effects on substantive rights. But the problem is that, just as he
critiques Justice Scalia, Justice Steven’s test is also no test at all—for it
will always lead to the same answer—application of the federal rule.
Justice Stevens states that it is “rare that a federal rule that is
facially valid under [the REA] will displace a State’s definition of its
own substantive rights.”83 Indeed, as Justice Stevens fashions his test, it
is almost impossible to conceive of a state law that would ever be found
to be “sufficiently interwoven” with the state’s definition of substantive
rights, yet at the same time “ordinarily procedural” in form such that a
court would ever reach the need to apply his test in the first place. Any
state law that is “ordinarily procedural” in its form, but “sufficiently
interwoven” with the state’s substantive law, in such a way that there is
“little doubt” the state meant it to be substantive, would simply not
realistically be in direct conflict with a federal rule and, thus, would not
be judged against the REA. That is, the group of state laws about which
Justice Stevens is concerned would be diverted off the REA track and
into the regular RODA analysis, to determine, per Hanna, if application
of the federal rule would lead to forum-shopping or an inequitable
administration of laws.84

81.
82.
83.
84.
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See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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As examples of state rules that are ordinarily procedural, but might
be so interwoven as to require application over a contrary federal rule,
Justice Stevens suggests that a rule about how damages are reviewed on
appeal may actually be a substantive damages cap. A statute of
limitations rule might actually be “a limit on the existence of the right to
seek redress,” and a standard of proof rule could really be a “definition
of the scope of the claim.”85 However, these examples do not support
his premise.
His first example is a recitation of the facts of Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities.86 In Gasperini, a New York statute permitted appellate
judges to order a new trial if a jury award “deviates materially from what
would be reasonable compensation.”87 The Court rejected the argument
that federal Rule 59(a), which allows for courts to grant new trials, was
in direct collision with the New York statute.88 As such, the REA did
not apply—there was no direct conflict between the federal rule and the
state law. Justice Stevens dissented in that case, but only on the
disposition. Notably, he agreed that “[b]ecause there is no conceivable
conflict between [Rule] 59 and the application of the New York
damages limit, this case is controlled by Erie and not the Rules Enabling
Act’s limitation on federal procedural rules that conflict with state
substantive rights.”89 As his first example of a state law that might be
subject to his “sufficiently interwoven” test for the REA’s substantive
rights limitation, Justice Stevens cited a law that he previously agreed is
outside the scope of his test.
As to Justice Stevens’s other proposed candidates for his
“sufficiently interwoven” test, there simply is no federal rule on point
that would cause his test to even be applied to them. “A rule that a
plaintiff can bring a claim for only three years” that “may really be a
limit on the existence of the right to seek redress,”90 would never be in
direct conflict against a federal rule because there simply is no
procedural federal rule establishing a statute of limitations. In fact, it is
long settled that statutes of limitations are substantive for Erie
purposes91—so that again, RODA applies, not REA. Finally, there is
likewise no federal rule or statute on point establishing burdens of
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
518 U.S. 415 (1996).
Id. at 418; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 2010).
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438 n.22.
Id. at 440 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1453 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).

.
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proof—any potential conflict between a federal law and a state law
would be handled under the RODA analysis.
The fact that Justice Stevens could not come up with a relevant
procedural state law that is so interwoven with a state’s substantive law
so as to make application of a federal rule a violation of the REA (or
even undergo his REA analysis) demonstrates that the initial appeal of
his approach—that he gives muscle to the substantive rights limitation of
the REA—is actually misplaced. In practice, Justice Stevens’s test
would simply lead to unnecessary confusion and require federal courts to
“consider[] hundreds of state rules”92 when there is seemingly no chance
that any rule that would be found substantive would undergo his test—
any such rule would be diverted off the REA track for lack of a direct
conflict with a federal rule. The analytical burden of Justice Stevens’s
test outweighs its initial academic appeal. As Justice Scalia concludes,
“[t]he more one explores the alternatives to Sibbach’s rule, the more its
wisdom becomes apparent.”93
IV. CONCLUSION: FUTURE LITIGATION AND SHADY GROVE’S IRONY
Shady Grove did little to clarify things. Indeed—it seems to have
made matters worse for those who might wish to understand the Court’s
Erie doctrine. Going forward, will Justice Scalia’s approach, true to
Hanna and Sibbach, apply—or are courts to apply Justice Steven’s
“sufficiently interwoven” test when a federal rule conflicts with a state
law?
Some commentators have suggested that Justice Stevens’s approach
controls, citing the practice that when there is a plurality opinion, the
narrower approach controls;94 however, it is hard to classify Justice
Stevens’s as the “more narrow” opinion. Against what benchmark are
we to judge narrowness? If deference to state procedural laws is the
benchmark, perhaps, Justice Stevens’s opinion is more narrow. But
Justice Stevens’s test, as this paper has demonstrated, reaches the same
result in all but potentially a few unascertainable cases, and in so doing,
up-ends precedent in Hanna and Sibbach. In that very real sense, Justice

92. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Ruling Opens Federal Courts to More Class
Actions,
THE
NAT’L
L.J.,
Apr.
1,
2010,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/scm/PubArticleSCM.jsp?id=1202447278574; Lyle Denniston, Analysis:
Sorting Out an Erie Sequel, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 31, 2010, 1:16 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/analysis-sorting-out-an-erie-sequel.
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Scalia’s plurality opinion is the more narrow. It certainly requires less
analysis for future courts.
Justice Ginsburg asserts that “a majority of [the] Court, it bears
emphasis, agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in
diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”95 But only
one justice—Justice Stevens—did so as part of the REA analysis, where
a federal rule is in direct conflict with a state law. The four dissenters
ignored Justice Stevens’s plea that they join him in arguing under the
REA framework.96 There was never any question that, under the RODA
analysis conducted by the dissenters, important state interests should be
considered. So, in that sense, the only five justices to speak on the
question of whether important state interests should be considered as
part of a REA analysis are those in the plurality and Justice Stevens.
Four justices say no; one justice says yes. The other four—the Shady
Grove dissenters—have not weighed in.
In that sense, Justice
Ginsburg’s point does not bear as much emphasis as she suggests.
While Shady Grove’s result, as announced by the plurality
decision, seems to best accord with the Court’s Erie jurisprudence and
follow the most workable path for courts applying the Rules in diversity
cases, one cannot help but remain alarmed by its result. New York
created a substantive cause of action and then decided, for whatever
reason, that it did not want that action to be brought through the class
action vehicle. Permitting such claims to be brought as class actions in
federal court seems unfair to defendants. As Justice Ginsburg notes, the
most effective way for Congress, should it be concerned with this
outcome, to remedy this seemingly unfair result of a fair application of
the Erie doctrine, is to pass a federal statute making diversity class
actions unavailable in cases where the state providing the substantive
law does not allow such claims to be brought as class actions in state
court.97
What is clear is the irony of this case, as Justice Ginsburg points
98
out. Were it not for CAFA extending federal diversity jurisdiction to
class actions with minimal diversity, Shady Grove could never have
brought this action in federal court. CAFA was passed for the express
purpose of limiting the number of class actions, under the expectation
that federal judges were less likely to certify class actions than state
judges.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1473 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1473.
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If CAFA had worked as Congress had intended, then one would
expect there to have been an increase in the number of class action
removals from state court to federal court, and a decrease in class
certifications overall. In the immediate aftermath of CAFA, removals
from state court did increase, but have since returned to pre-CAFA
levels.99 What is anomalous and, perhaps, the most striking result of
CAFA, is the dramatic increase in new original filings of class actions in
federal court—that is, instances in which plaintiffs have chosen to file
their class actions in federal, rather, than state court.100 Indeed, filings
increased in district courts in eleven of the twelve circuits.101 Given the
large number of district courts in which plaintiffs’ class action counsel
can choose to file, it should not be altogether that surprising that they
would use CAFA to file their actions strategically in federal district
courts they find favorable, rather than be removed from favorable state
courts into potentially unfavorable federal courts.
CAFA was not the deathblow to class actions that some may have
hoped it would be. Indeed, CAFA seems to have led to results Congress
did not expect: an increase in the number of class actions in federal
court, and now it has torpedoed a state’s attempt to rein in class actions.
Shady Grove provides a stark example of what can happen when
Congress tries to reach a substantive outcome—decreased liability for
defendant businesses—by tinkering with procedural mechanisms and
jurisdiction.

99. EMILY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2008), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0408.pdf/$file/cafa0408.pdf.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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